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A Constitutional Dilemma for Cities Seeking
to Regulate Day Labor Solicitation,
by MONICA SMITH'
Introduction
On September 16, 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued a decision in Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of
Redondo Beach ("Comite III") invalidating an ordinance that
prohibited individuals from standing on streets or sidewalks and
soliciting work, business, or contributions from passing vehicles.! The
ordinance was aimed, in large part, at preventing day laborers
("jornaleros") from congregating along busy streets in search of ad
hoc employment.' The Court, sitting en banc, declared the law a
facially unconstitutional restriction on speech because it was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the city's interest in traffic flow and
safety.' In so doing, the Court reversed a 2010 panel decision in the
case6 and expressly overturned ACORN v. City of Phoenix, a 25-year-
1. A version of this note was first published in the Public Law Journal of the State
Bar of California.
2. Juris Doctor Candidate 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; B.A. University of Utah, Philosophy. The author wishes to thank Professor David
Jung for his support and direction; Professor David Faigman for his guidance on
constitutional jurisprudence; her family for their patient accommodation of her graduate
work; and the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their care and skill
in improving this note.
3. 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011); REDONDO BEACH, CAL. MUN. CODE § 3-7.1601(a)
(1989) (making it a violation to "stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to
solicit, employment, business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor vehicle"
and defining "street or highway" to include sidewalks).
4. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 941 (citing City Attorney's memorandum accompanying
proposed ordinance as saying, "the City has had extreme difficulties with persons soliciting
employment from the sidewalks along the Artesia corridor over the last several years").
5. Id. at 940-41.
6. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach (Comite II),
607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011).
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old decision that had upheld a nearly identical ordinance, to the
extent that it was inconsistent with the Court's en banc decision.! The
following February, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, settling
Comite III as the governing law in the Ninth Circuit.'
Although the decision is unquestionably a victory for day
laborers in the Ninth Circuit, it leaves unsettling gaps in the law.
First, in its reliance on First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the
decision sidesteps questions about possible underlying reasons for
regulating day labor solicitation-reasons that may include race-
based animus, implicating the Equal Protection Clause,9 or attempts
to regulate immigration in violation of federal preemption doctrine.'o
Second, the decision invites the question of what sort of city
regulation would be permissible under Comite III.
This paper examines Comite III in light of these questions and in
comparison to a successful equal protection challenge by day laborers
in Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck." Using the reasoning of Doe, I will
show how a theoretical attempt to tailor the Redondo Beach
ordinance more closely to the city's interests to avoid a First
Amendment violation could instead give rise to a credible equal
protection challenge. Thus, when cities attempt to regulate day
laborers, they will often find themselves running afoul of either the
First or Fourteenth Amendment. Cities can, however, avoid this
constitutional dilemma through leadership and creativity, addressing
legitimate community concerns without infringing on the
constitutional rights of individuals.
7. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 942 (overturning ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d
1260 (9th Cir. 1986)).
8. Comite III, 657 F.3d 936, cert. denied, No. 11-760, 2012 WL 538394 (Feb. 21,
2012).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land .. ..");
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (permitting Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization ... throughout the United States"). Federal preemption doctrine is beyond
the scope of this note. For a discussion of federal preemption doctrine in the context of
day labor solicitation ordinances, see Kristina M. Campbell, The High Cost of Free Speech:
Anti-Solicitation Ordinances, Day Laborers, and the Impact of "Backdoor" Local
Immigration Regulations, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 31-42 (2010), and Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV.
567 (2008).
11. 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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I. Day Labor Solicitation and the First Amendment
The term "day laborer," or "jornalero," describes an individual
who accepts employment, usually manual labor, on an as-needed
basis." Day laborers often make their availability known by standing
in groups along high-traffic streets in urban areas, although in some
regions, day labor centers are available for this purpose." Day
laborers are usually Latino men, and their employers are often
construction or landscaping contractors.'4 Although some members
of the public often assume day laborers are all recently arrived illegal
aliens, many are in fact present in the United States legally. 5
The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech does not
depend on the immigration status of the individual invoking it.
Additionally, solicitation is considered "speech" within the meaning
of the First Amendment." In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, the Supreme Court articulated the basis for this
holding, stating that solicitation "is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or
social issues," and that "without solicitation the flow of such
information and advocacy would likely cease." Although soliciting
12. IMMIGR. RIGHTS/INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, CTR. FOR Soc. JUSTICE, SETON
HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, ALL WORK AND NO PAY: DAY LABORERS, WAGE THEFT,
AND WORKPLACE JUSTICE IN NEW JERSEY 1 (2011). See generally YOLANDA ALINDOR,
ZELLERBACH FAMILY FOUND., BAY AREA DAY LABOR PROGRAMS: SERVICES,
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, AND PRIORITIES (Lina Avidan, ed., Jan. 2007), available at
http://www.zellerbachfamilyfoundation.org/pdfs/labor-report.pdf.
13. IMMIGR. RIGHTS/INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, supra note 12, at 1; ALINDOR,
supra note 12.
14. Campbell, supra note 10, at 1, 22.
15. Id. at 22 (citing DAY LABOR RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FAQ,
http:// daylaborinfo.org/FAQ.aspx (last visited March 31, 2012) ("It is a misconception to
think that all day laborers are 'illegal aliens.' We have found day labor corners where all
the day laborers have legal papers ... and have found everywhere that day laborers often
have legal papers. It is impossible to look at a group of day laborers and discern which
have papers and which don't.")).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech...."). Aliens, whether undocumented or not, have been considered "persons"
within the meaning of the Constitution. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214 (1982)
(extending the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to undocumented
alien children for purposes of public education).
17. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1992)
(citing Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); see also,
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990); Riley v. Nat'I Fed'n of Blind of North
Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788-89 (1988)).
18. 444 U.S. 620,632 (1980).
Fall 2012]1 121
day labor opportunities is not exactly similar to expressing "views" or
"seeking support for causes," it is "speech" in the sense that it
involves an announcement of availability for work. This
announcement is made, in part, by congregating in groups along
streets and perhaps gesturing to attract the attention of employers."
In many appellate cases challenging day labor solicitation regulation,
and in most such cases in the Ninth Circuit, such solicitation has been
held to constitute speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment.20
The public streets and sidewalks on which day laborers gather
"occup[y] a 'special position in terms of First Amendment
protection"' as the "'archetype of a traditional public forum"' for
speech.2 1 When deciding the constitutionality of government
restriction on speech in a public forum, a court must determine
whether the restriction is content-based or content-neutral." A
content-based restriction is one that "by [its] terms distinguish[es]
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed."a A content-neutral restriction is one that is
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." 24
19. See Answering Brief of Appellees at 7, Comite II, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010),
2007 WL 2434115 (stating that "the workers announce their availability for work through
the very act of gathering in a public area, making themselves visible, gesturing to potential
employers, or otherwise expressing their desire to work"). The dissent in Comite III
disputes whether soliciting work is speech. Comite III, 657 F.3d 936, 958 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) ("Sure, it implicates speech, but almost everything implicates
communication of some sort; governing would be impossible if price fixing, streetwalking,
gambling, blackmail, employment discrimination, the sale of human organs, operating a
retail business and the gazillion other activities that involve communication were all
subject to strict scrutiny.").
20. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2006); Lopez v.
Town of Cave Creek, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1031 (D. Ariz. 2008); Berger v. City of Seattle,
569 F.3d 1029, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009); ACORN, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986); Coal. for
Human Immigrant Rights of L.A. v. Burke (CHIRLA), No. CV 98-4863-GHK(CTX),
2000 WL 1481467 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2000); Comite de Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of
Glendale, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46603 at 6 (C.D. Cal. May 13,2005).
21. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (quoting United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) and Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,480 (1988)).
22. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
23. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). Under certain
circumstances a "content-based purpose" may be sufficient to find that a restriction is
content based. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
24. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("The government's purpose is the controlling
consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others... Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is
'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech."') (internal citation
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To support content-based restrictions, the government must show
that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest." For content-neutral restrictions, the
government may "impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.""' Thus, narrow tailoring is required for both
content-neutral and content-based restrictions on speech. A
"narrowly tailored" restriction is one that does not "burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests.""
A. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach
1. Background
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance in the city of Phoenix,
Arizona, aimed at preventing a form of solicitation known as
"tagging."2 Individuals associated with the nonprofit Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN") approached
cars stopped at red lights to provide literature and solicit donations.29
The Phoenix ordinance in dispute in ACORN v. City of Phoenix read,
"[n]o person shall stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt
to solicit, employment, business or contributions from the occupants
of any vehicle."3 In spite of the ordinance's breadth, the court found
it a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction consistent with
omitted). The rules announced in Ward leave considerable room for confusion. See
ACLU, 466 F.3d at 794 & n.10 (holding that bans on acts of solicitation are content-
neutral, while bans on words of solicitation are content-based.); see generally Campbell,
supra note 10, at 3-20.
25. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
26. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
27. Id. at 799.
28. ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1986).
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting PHOENIX, ARIZ. CITY ORDINANCE § 36-131.01 (1984)).
Fall 20121 123
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding content-neutral exclusions on
speech in public fora."
By May 1987, the City of Redondo Beach adopted nearly
identical language for an ordinance proposed by the city attorney as a
response to "extreme difficulties with persons soliciting employment
from the sidewalks."' The Redondo Beach ordinance additionally
defined "street or highway" to include sidewalks, curbs, and other
roadway structures." In 1989, the City added a prohibition on
stopping to hire workers.' Thus, the complete ordinance read as
follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to stand on a street or
highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment,
business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor
vehicle. For purposes of this section, "street or highway" shall
mean all of that area dedicated to public use for public street
purposes and shall include, but not be limited to, roadways,
parkways, medians, alleys, sidewalks, curbs, and public ways.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to stop, park or stand a
motor vehicle on a street or highway from which any occupant
attempts to hire or hires for employment another person or
persons.
In 2004, fifteen years after adopting the ordinance in its final
form, the City began an undercover operation to catch laborers in the
act, arresting sixty day laborers and one employer over a 16-day
period. In response, two advocacy organizations, Comite de
Jornaleros de Redondo Beach and the National Day Laborer
31. Id. at 1267-68 (relying on City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986); Perry v. Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Heffron
v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
32. Appellant's Opening Brief at 35, Comite II, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010), 2007
WL 1994704. Although the City Attorney's memorandum cited in the decision refers to
the selling of "certain products," there is no mention of sales as an issue in the district
court's decision or in the City's briefs on appeal; the case has focused on the City's
asserted interest in addressing traffic safety at day labor solicitation sites. Id.
33. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 941; REDONDO BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 3-7.1601(a)
(1989).
34. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 942; REDONDO BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 3-7.1601(b)
(1989).
35. REDONDO BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 3-7.1601 (1989).
36. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 942.
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Organizing Network ("NDLON"), filed suit in federal district court
to challenge the law as a facially unconstitutional restriction on
speech." The district court, citing ACORN, found the ordinance
content-neutral" but not narrowly tailored to achieve the City's stated
interests of traffic safety, crime prevention, and aesthetics."
Accordingly, the district court found for the plaintiffs, permanently
enjoining the City from enforcing the ordinance.40
On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's
decision, relying on ACORN as precedent, but also granted rehearing
en banc." Since 1986, several decisions in Ninth Circuit cases had
distinguished ACORN, so the day laborers' case gave the court a
chance to resolve confusion.42
2. The Court's Analysis
On rehearing, the court divided over several issues. Writing for a
clear majority, Judge Milan Smith held that the ordinance was a
facially unconstitutional restriction on speech because it was
overbroad, burdening significantly more speech than necessary to
achieve the city's purpose." The majority split, however, on whether
the ordinance was content-neutral or content-based. Judge Smith
argued in a special concurrence that it was a content-based restriction
that failed strict scrutiny and failed to leave open ample alternative
channels of communication." Judge Ronald Gould concurred in the
judgment but thought the ordinance needed only alternative channels
37. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach (Comite 1),
475 F. Supp. 2d 952 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
38. Id. at 959-63 (disagreeing with plaintiffs' assertion that the ordinance was
content-based on its face, and arguing that even so, the "secondary effects" doctrine
applied and allowed the court to analyze the statute as content-neutral because the City
showed the purpose was to eliminate an undesirable effect-unsafe traffic-unrelated to
the solicitation content of the speech).
39. Id. at 964-66.
40. Id. at 970 (granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because the
ordinance, although content-neutral, was not narrowly tailored to achieve the City's
interests, and did not leave open ample alternative channels for solicitation speech).
41. Comite II, 607 F.3d 1178; Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of
Redondo Beach, 623 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2010) (order granting rehearing en banc).
42. See, supra, note 20.
43. Comite II, 657 F.3d at 951.
44. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 951-57 (Smith, J., concurring; Thomas, J., joining;
Graeber, J., joining as to content-neutrality but not alternative channels of
communication).
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of communication to withstand "time, place, and manner" scrutiny.45
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and Judge Carlos Bea joined together in
"deep dissent," arguing that the conduct regulated did not constitute
speech,46 and even if the conduct was speech, the ordinance was
narrowly drawn and left open ample alternative channels of
communication, making it a permissible restriction on speech."4
In the majority opinion, Judge Smith analyzed the Redondo
Beach ordinance in light of the city's asserted interest: "promoting
traffic flow and safety."4' As to whether the ordinance was a
"reasonable time, place, or manner" restriction, he found two sources
of overbreadth. 49 First, the ordinance on its face prohibited forms of
speech that "do not cause the types of problems that motivated the
Ordinance.",o The majority held that the ordinance would prohibit
many typical examples of ordinary speech: "Girl Scouts selling
cookies on the sidewalk," "signbearers on sidewalks seeking
patronage," "children shouting 'carwash' at passing vehicles," and
even "a motorist who stops, on a residential street, to inquire whether
a neighbor's teenage daughter or son would be interested in
performing yard work or babysitting.""
Second, the court found the ordinance "geographically
overinclusive" because the city offered evidence of problems at only
two locations.52 On its face, the ordinance applied to all roadways,
prohibiting instances of solicitation speech even in locations where it
would be unlikely to imperil traffic flow and safety." As the majority
pointed out, "the Ordinance does not even distinguish between
lawfully parked cars and cars moving in traffic, and there is no reason
45. Id. at 951 (Gould, J., concurring) ("We err when we make it so hard for
municipalities to satisfy the test for reasonable restraints on time, place, and manner of
speech that these municipalities cannot achieve important public goals like traffic safety
while preserving speech.").
46. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
47. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 959 (Kozinski, C. J., dissenting) (asserting that the
ordinance regulates "a very narrow and finely drawn class of conduct: standing around on
sidewalks and street corners in order to interact with passing motorists" and arguing that
newspapers, Craigslist, and six established hiring centers in the Los Angeles area provide
ample alternatives).
48. Id. at 947.
49. Id. at 948-51.
50. Id. at 948.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 949.
53. Id.
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to believe ... that a lawfully parked car would create the types of
traffic problems described by the City."M
In addition to finding the ordinance over-inclusive, the majority
found the ordinance unnecessary, noting that the city already had
laws at its disposal that addressed traffic issues, including state
statutes against jaywalking and stopping in a red zone, as well as city
ordinances prohibiting standing in roads impeding traffic or standing
closer to the curb than necessary on sidewalks in the business
districts." Drawing an analogy to commercial speech, the Court cited
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. for the proposition that
the availability of "numerous and obvious less-burdensome
alternatives" to the law being challenged was a relevant consideration
to the question of narrow tailoring." The majority concluded that the
ordinance was facially invalid "[b]ecause [it] 'suppress[es] a great
quantity of speech that does not cause the evils that it seeks to
eliminate.""' Thus, the court overruled ACORN "to the extent that it
construed a substantially identically worded ordinance as facially
restricting only solicitation conduct.""
The opinions in Comite III reveal several key areas of dispute in
the First Amendment analysis of anti-solicitation ordinances. First, as
Chief Judge Kozinski asked in his dissent, in what respect is
solicitation "speech"?" He argued that the "speech" in question was
really conduct-"precisely the kind of conduct that's regulated when
we require retail establishments to obtain business licenses, maintain
health standards, buy insurance and hire workers based on merit
rather than race or sex."a The conduct that drew the attention of
employers and caused the purported traffic problems was simply
standing in a group on a street with an apparent willingness to be
54. Id. Contra ACORN, 798 F.2d at 1262 (stating that "the mere presence of taggers
on the roadway or intersection is a potential safety hazard").
55. Id. at 949-50.
56. Id. at 950 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417
n.13 (1993)). The majority is not arguing that the day laborers' conduct is "commercial
speech" that is subject to the test for commercial speech. First, the language of the statute
is not confined to commercial solicitation. Second, even if day labor solicitation is
commercial speech, the lawsuit is a facial challenge, so the burdening of speech other than
the plaintiffs' is at issue. Id. at 945 n.2.
57. Id. at 950 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 n.7).
58. Id. at 947 n.5.
59. Id. at 959 (Kozinski, C. J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 958-59 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
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hired." Cities are permitted to impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on activities like loitering, which is almost
indistinguishable from the conduct in dispute here. The dissent
further supported its point by framing the phenomenon the city
sought to abolish as an "impromptu labor market," rather than as a
set of individuals conveying a message about their interest in
employment.62
There is, however, rich precedent in the Ninth Circuit for
analyzing solicitation conduct as speech.' Indeed, the holding in
ACORN analyzed conduct as speech."4 Furthermore, as the majority
points out, this is a facial challenge; therefore, the speech of concern
to the court was not solely that of the day laborers, but that of all
persons whose protected speech could fall within the scope of the
ordinance.'
Another area of dispute is whether the restriction in Comite III
was content-based or content-neutral. The majority was divided on
this question, with three members writing that the restriction was
content-based on its face because it expressly "prohibits certain
subject matters-any solicitation related to 'employment, business, or
contributions'-and allows all other solicitation (such as political
solicitation) to continue unabated."' Nevertheless, there are two
diverging lines of precedent in the Ninth Circuit--one finding
restrictions on solicitation content-neutral and the other content-
based."
A final area of dispute is the nature of the government interests
at stake. The majority analyzed the ordinance as if the only
government interest at stake was "promoting traffic flow and
safety"-an undisputed government responsibility that can support
61. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
62. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 958 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
63. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
64. See A CORN, 798 F.2d 1260.
65. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
66. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 953 (Smith, J., concurring). Judge Smith finds the closest
parallel in Burson v. Freeman, which held that an ordinance prohibiting the soliciting of
votes near polling places on election day was a content-based restriction in that it did not
prevent any other kind of speech near polling places on election day. Id. (citing Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-94 (1992)).
67. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 4-20 (separating the two lines of precedent in
which the Ninth Circuit found restrictions on solicitation to be either content neutral or
content based).
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reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.6 Indeed,
this is the sole interest the plain language of the ordinance appears to
address. But the dissent cites several additional ills: littering,
vandalism, public urination, blocking the path for pedestrians,
harassing women, and damaging property.0 Although the City
argued these interests in district court and included them in its
opening brief on appeal," the majority refused to consider them
because the City failed to argue on appeal that its ordinance was
narrowly tailored to address these ills.7 Even if it had, the City might
have found it hard to carry this argument, since the ordinance on its
face addresses only traffic concerns, and the City had available
numerous other laws with which it could have addressed these other
ills. 72
This quandary illustrates the problem with using a First
Amendment theory to challenge municipal targeting of day laborers:
technical distinctions often neglect the underlying reasons for such
action, including racial animus and anti-immigrant attitudes. The
following sections of this paper explore the underlying reasons more
directly.
B. The Indirect Nature of First Amendment Overbreadth Challenges
Comite III is just one of several successful challenges to anti-
solicitation ordinances based on the First Amendment.73  But as
successful as the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine was in
Comite III, the decision is unsatisfying for a number of reasons. First,
68. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 947-48 (majority opinion) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965)).
69. Id. at 957 n.1 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
70. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, 13, 34, 35, Comite II, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 06-55750), 2007 WL 1994704.
71. Id. at 947 n.6 (quoting Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 n.1 (9th Cir.
2008)) ("We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does
not preserve a claim.").
72. In Answering Brief of Appellees at 47, Comite II, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No. 06-55750), 2007 WL 2434115, plaintiffs state: "Under California law, pedestrians may
be cited for walking outside a crosswalk and in the roadway in a manner that constitutes
an immediate hazard, or for willfully and maliciously obstructing the free movement of
any person on a street or sidewalk. Cal. Veh. Code § 21954; Cal. Penal Code § 647(c).
California law also forbids drivers to stop or block traffic in specified places, including
alongside a parked vehicle. Cal. Veh. Code § 22500. Littering, public urination, and
fighting are all against the law. See Redondo Beach Mun. Code § 4-9.201 (littering); Cal.
Penal Code § 594 (vandalism); id. § 415 (fighting); People v. McDonald, 137 Cal. App. 4th
521, 533-39 (2006) (public urination violates Cal. Penal Code §§ 370 & 372)."
73. See supra note 20.
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while there is substantial precedent within the Ninth Circuit for using
overbreadth arguments to strike down anti-solicitation ordinances,
there is an absence of appellate decisions in other circuits applying
the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine to such ordinances.
Second, by focusing the debate on technical distinctions that are
peculiar to First Amendment jurisprudence, such challenges sidestep
the prejudice that can infect every stage of government action against
day laborers-a traditionally politically powerless minority.4 Most
importantly, the very basis of an overbreadth challenge is that the law
in question infringes on expression other than that of the plaintiff by
encompassing more conduct than is necessary to address its legitimate
aim, thus threatening to chill speech that would otherwise receive
First Amendment protection." For advocates who wish to change
public attitudes and build support for the right of day laborers to seek
honest work, free from race- or nationality-based harassment, First
Amendment challenges fail to address the goal head-on. A challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution addresses this
goal directly. Doe v. Village of Marnaroneck, a Second Circuit case
discussed in the following section, illustrates an effective use of equal
protection doctrine on behalf of day laborers subjected to prejudice
while seeking work.
II. Day Labor Solicitation and Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause states that "[n]o State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."" The Clause is "essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike."" Its guarantee generally
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens,
whether documented or not."
74. See generally Campbell, supra note 10.
75. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (invalidating a statute that
prohibited the burning of a cross with intent to intimidate); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating an ordinance prohibiting certain acts, such as cross burning,
when they are based on racial bias and other criteria); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972) (reversing conviction under a statute prohibiting the use of "opprobrious words of
abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace").
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
77. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985).
78. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886) ("The rights of the
petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of which they complain, are not less because
they are aliens and subjects of the emperor of China.").
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Ordinarily, where individuals within a group differ from one
another in ways that are relevant to government interests,
discrimination by the government on the basis of those characteristics
is subject to "rational basis" scrutiny, in which the party challenging
the action must show that the law has no rational relationship to a
legitimate government purpose." However, when the government
discriminates against a "suspect class," the government action is
subject to heightened scrutiny when challenged; race and alienage are
such suspect classifications.' Even a statute or policy that is not
expressly drawn along racial lines may violate the Equal Protection
Clause if the statute is motivated by intent to discriminate against a
suspect class." Disparate impact on a suspect class may provide
evidence of discriminatory intent." However, disparate impact alone
is not sufficient; the government action must be taken with
discriminatory intent." Thus, a party challenging a government
statute or policy that is facially nondiscriminatory must show both
disparate impact and discriminatory intent.
A plaintiff who can show that the government action being
challenged was motivated by racial animus does not need to show
that a similarly situated group of a different race was treated
differently; the very use of a policy against a group because of its race
makes that group uniquely situated.'
Once the plaintiff shows that the government action was
"motivated at least in part by a racially discriminatory purpose,"
defendants seeking to uphold their actions have the burden of
79. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42.
80. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214
(1982) (extending the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
undocumented alien children for purposes of public education); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368
("The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of which they complain, are
not less because they are aliens and subjects of the emperor of China.").
81. See generally Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.
82. Washington, 426 U.S. at 229-30.
83. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239-41.
84. United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1153-54 (D. Kan. 2004)
(allowing plaintiffs to show discriminatory impact through statistical evidence, rather than
pointing to a similarly situated group); Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d
520, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Once racially discriminatory intent infects the application of a
neutral law or policy, the group that is singled out for discriminatory treatment is no
longer similarly situated to any other in the eyes of the law, so adverse effects can be
presumed. In effect, the law recognizes that a government that sets out to discriminate
intentionally in its enforcement of some neutral law or policy will rarely if ever fail to
achieve its purpose.").
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establishing that the same result would have been reached without
consideration of race.'
A. Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck
Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck is notable because it is an equal
protection challenge taken on the part of day laborers. Several
individual day laborers and the National Day Laborer Organizing
Network ("NDLON") sued the Village of Mamaroneck following a
shift in the village's policy regarding street-side day labor
solicitation." For several decades, men had gathered along streets in
the Columbus Park neighborhood of the village to seek ad hoc
employment from contractors." Until the 1990s, most of the men
were white; by 2004, nearly all were Latino." In the early 2000s, the
number of men seeking employment as day laborers increased from
20-30 per day to 60-80 per day, with 12-15 contractors per day
stopping to hire workers." In 2004, the village launched what the Doe
court described as a targeted campaign of "harassment and
intimidation against ... Latino day laborers ... effectuated through
the discriminatory application of a neutral law."" First, village
officials, with the approval of the mayor, the traffic commission, and
the village board of trustees, moved the solicitation site from the
sidewalk to a designated parking lot some distance away." At about
the same time, the mayor began making public statements
exaggerating the number of day laborers and claiming, without
foundation, that they were not residents of the village.9 These official
acts were accompanied by an "unprecedented police presence" that
included stationing numerous officers and police cars in the area
during prime hiring hours and aggressively ticketing any contractors
85. Doe, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (citing United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600,
612 (2d Cir. 1996)).
86. Id. at 524-26. The court dismissed NDLON from the suit for lack of injury in fact.
Id. at 541.
87. Id. at 525.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 525-26.
90. Id. at 546.
91. Id. at 526.
92. Id. at 526-27 (finding that the police estimate was less than half the 200-225
claimed by the mayor, and noting that no study of residency was done until 2006, at which
time it was found that by far most day laborers were actually residents of the village).
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that stopped.' The court found that the mayor's public statements
had been "designed to justify the law enforcement campaign that
ensued." 94 The campaign was effective: within a month, the number
of laborers at the site was cut in half and employers began avoiding
the hiring site.
The police presence continued into 2006, with police arriving
each day at about 7 a.m., when day laborers began to congregate at
the hiring site, and departing at about 11 a.m., by which time the
chances of employment had normally passed." Before this campaign,
no police vehicle had ever before been permanently stationed
anywhere in the village. While ticketing contractors at the day labor
pick-up site, sometimes only for stopping, police often ignored traffic
and parking infractions elsewhere, or even at the same location when
not committed by a contractor." A local store owner saw officers
ticketing Latino drivers for seatbelt violations while allowing white
drivers an opportunity to buckle up before being cited." At a nearby
childcare center, parents dropping off children were not ticketed or
intimidated in the same manner.
The village justified its enforcement campaign by citing "quality
of life" issues, such as prostitution, drug dealing, and other criminal
activity."' However, the court found that these issues were unrelated
to the day laborers' presence, especially since no complaints had been
made to the police or other officials regarding other purported
problems like public intoxication and urination.'o2
In December 2005, a neighboring city closed its day laborer
hiring center for the winter.a The village board of trustees, claiming
without foundation that the nearby closure had caused a local
increase in day laborers in the village, voted to close the village hiring
site."" When day laborers attempted to return to their old location
93. Id. at 527 (finding that in the four weeks after the move to the new site, 204
tickets were issued).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 527-28.
96. Id. at 528.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 529.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 530.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 531.
104. Id. at 531-33.
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along a street, they were threatened with citation or arrest, and the
village trustees voted to prohibit trucks from traveling through the
area.0 o The chief of police ordered subordinate officers to subject
contractors picking up day laborers to time-consuming "safety
inspections."" As the day laborers moved, the attention of the police
and trustees followed them.'? The police established checkpoints at
which contractors' trucks were stopped and the court found those
checkpoints were "intended to intimidate contractors and prevent
them from picking up the day laborers" in order to reduce the
number of day laborers in the village.'? The mayor also told the press
that the village was "aggressively ticketing the day laborers and the
contractors who hire them.""09 Furthermore, the police approached
individual laborers and told them that not only could they not stand
in certain locations, despite not blocking traffic, but that they also
could not sit on a bench because children played nearby."o The
campaign was effective-many contractors stopped picking up day
laborers in the village, and many day laborers stopped seeking
employment there."'
Importantly, the court found no evidence that anyone other than
day laborers and their potential employers were subject to this kind
of enforcement, including drivers picking up passengers or parents
dropping off children at school."' The court also determined that
"[tlhe complaints and purported fears of certain village residents
were motivated, consciously or unconsciously, by racial animus
towards the day laborers,"" and "[tihe fact that the day laborers were
Latinos and not whites was, at least in part, a motivating factor in [the
village's] actions."l 4
Judge McMahon applied reasoning from a line of Second Circuit
decisions about facially neutral laws applied with discriminatory
intent and effect: "Where, as here, a particular group (day laborers
and those who hire them) was specifically targeted for heightened
105. Id. at 533-35.
106. Id. at 535.
107. Id. at 534-35
108. Id. at 536, 539.
109. Id. at 536-37.
110. Id. at 537.
111. Id. at 539.
112. Id. at 538-39.
113. Id. at 540.
114. Id. at 543.
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enforcement of certain types of laws-like those involving traffic
violations-it will be all but impossible to find a similarly situated
group of persons. Pyke and Brown stand for the proposition that this
is no bar to an equal protection claim.""' Judge McMahon reasoned
that the facts showed both racially discriminatory intent and disparate
effect:
When the Mayor announces that the day laborers represent
an "out of control problem," and puts a plan in place to
reduce the number of day laborers in the village through a
campaign of "aggressively ticketing the day laborers and the
contractors who hire them;" when the police chief directs his
subordinates to subject the contractors who hire day laborers
to rigorous and time-consuming inspections and orders a
police officer to monitor the drop-off of day laborers in the
afternoons to look for traffic violations; when a dissenting
trustee candidly admits that, after chasing the day laborers out
of the park, the police set up unprecedented checkpoints on
Mamaroneck Ave. to get rid of them-on such a record, no
doubt remains that defendants' actions were intended
precisely to harass and intimidate contractors and thereby to
deter them from picking up day laborers in Mamaroneck.
Moreover, the record also demonstrates that, at least
insofar as the targeted traffic ticketing campaign was
concerned, the Village did not fail to achieve its purpose. Its
campaign of harassment and intimidation against the Latino
day laborers in Mamaroneck-effectuated through the
discriminatory application of a neutral law.. . -has had
precisely those adverse effects that were intended. The
evidence adduced at trial proved beyond peradventure that
the number of contractors who came to Mamaroneck to pick
up day laborers in the Village of Mamaroneck in the wake of
the targeted ticketing campaign was substantially reduced.
This evidence of adverse and discriminatory effects means
that, while plaintiffs' relationship to the rest of the population
of Mamaroneck may not be quite as idiosyncratic as that of
the plaintiffs in Pyke, this is still a case in which the
requirement of showing a similarly situated group should not
115. Id. at 544 (applying Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2001) and Brown v.
City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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be erected as an insurmountable barrier to plaintiffs' equal
protection claim."'
Judge McMahon subsequently determined that the enforcement
campaign was aimed at a protected class-the day laborers who were
almost entirely Latino"-and that the police failed to undertake a
comparable effort when it ignored infractions of the same law by
parents of schoolchildren and drivers picking up passengers in the
area, even when drivers stopped in traffic."" Most egregiously, the
court found the campaign targeted Latino drivers for infractions
when white drivers were merely given a warning."'
In deciding whether racial animus was behind the village's action,
Judge McMahon also considered the factors suggested by the
Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.: "(1) [T~he historical background of the
decision, (2) the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision, (3) whether there were any departures from the
normal procedural sequence, and (4) contemporary statements made
by the decision-making body....',20 Mamaroneck was historically
tolerant of day laborers; the dramatic shift in policy came only after
the day labor population shifted to a Latino majority. The campaign
of "unremitting hostility" was without precedent and was applied
uniquely to the day laborers and their employers.12 ' Additionally,
statements made publicly by village officials were "negative and
stigmatizing" for the day laborers." Thus, all of the Arlington
Heights factors weighed in favor of finding racial animus. The court
dismissed the defendants' rationale-a sudden decrease in "quality of
life" in the neighborhood-as "wholly pretextual."'" Police
department records showed no appreciable increase in crime
corresponding to day laborer presence." Nor was there a
relationship between the campaign-traffic enforcement from 7 a.m.
116. Id. at 546.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 547.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266-68 (1977)).
121. Id. at 549.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 553.
124. Id.
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to 11 a.m.-and purported problems like "urinating in public,
defecation, catcalls, fighting, drinking, blocking sidewalks, littering,
smoking marijuana and sleeping overnight."" There was no evidence
of a decrease in crime after the closure of the day labor site.2 6
Consequently, the court found the village liable for violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
B. Comite III and Doe Compared
When these suits were filed, the Ninth Circuit had ample
precedent for First Amendment overbreadth challenges of anti-
solicitation ordinances, so it was natural for plaintiffs to argue, and
for the court to apply, the overbreadth doctrine in Comite III.'2
Meanwhile, the Second Circuit had ample precedent for applying
equal protection doctrine to anti-solicitation actions."9 Had the
precedents not diverged so dramatically, the factual differences
between Comite and Doe would have been enough to explain why the
plaintiffs in Comite III invoked overbreadth doctrine, while the
plaintiffs in Doe invoked equal protection doctrine. The facts of Doe
included a sudden shift in policy after a change in the racial
composition of the day laborer population, a years-long pattern of
targeted attention from law enforcement, contemporaneous negative
statements by officials that cast groundless and stigmatizing
aspersions on the day laborers, a stark mismatch between the
purported government interests and the laws employed to address
them, strong evidence of disproportionate enforcement against day
laborers, and extensive documentation of the effects enforcement had
on day laborers."
In Redondo Beach, on the other hand, the government action
consisted of a law passed in 1987 to address day labor solicitation
issues, yet not used against day laborers until 2004-and then only for
four weeks."' While Comite III provides its own proof of disparate
impact under Doe-a "sting" operation specifically aimed at day
laborers, without evidence of any similar enforcement against other
groups-overall, the evidence of racial animus is much thinner than in
125. Id.
126. Id. at 554.
127. Id. at 560.
128. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
129. Doe, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
130. See section II.A above.
131. See text accompanying notes 32 through 36.
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Doe. The only contemporaneous public statement by a city official in
the record is the mayor of Redondo Beach urging the city council to
"eliminate this problem of congregating day laborers.""' Echoing the
facts of Doe, in Comite III, one of the locations where day laborers
gathered was "just four blocks from Madison Elementary School,""'
suggesting that the day laborers down the street posed some special
danger to schoolchildren. However, the presence of schoolchildren
could also be interpreted as a legitimate reason for extra traffic
enforcement.
In contrast to the Village of Mamaroneck's policy, the Redondo
Beach ordinance bore a relationship to at least one of the city's stated
purposes, promoting traffic flow and safety.'" The ordinance
furthermore only targeted solicitation aimed at drivers of vehicles,
not those persons standing on the street.' In Doe, the court declined
to find a plausible relationship between any of the village's purported
interests and their campaign of traffic enforcement.
The important differences in the actions taken by these two cities
dictated that different theories be used in each case. Suppose,
however, the City of Redondo Beach attempts to change its
ordinance to make it consistent with the First Amendment. In what
follows, I will show that the result would be an ordinance that could
expose the city to an equal protection-based challenge along the lines
of Doe.
ll. The Dilemma for Cities
The majority in Comite III confidently asserts, "[w]e do not
doubt that a properly drawn ordinance could achieve the City's goals;
however, this Ordinance does not pass the test."' 6 What ordinance
would receive majority approval? The opinions in Comite III suggest
several possibilities. One is to sever section (a), the prohibition on
solicitation conduct, from the ordinance leaving only section (b),
which prohibits drivers from stopping in the roadway to hire
132. Answering Brief of Appellees at 8, Comite II, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010) (No.
06-55750) 2007 WL 2434115.
133. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, Comite II, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06-
55750) 2007 WL 1994704.
134. REDONDO BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 3-7.1601 (1989) (prohibiting individuals
from soliciting work, business, or contributions from passing vehicles, and prohibiting
motorists from stopping in traffic to make a hire).
135. Id.
136. Comite III, 657 F.3d 936 at 950-51 (9th Cir. 2011).
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workers."' The majority rejected this approach, but only for
procedural, not substantive, reasons."' By severing (a), the ordinance
would not burden solicitation speech at all and would more closely fit
the city's real interest in preventing traffic snarls. The problem is that
the resulting ordinance would still target those seeking to hire day
laborers and not those who stop for other reasons. In Doe, the
village's use of traffic laws against the employers of day laborers
helped persuade the court of the village's hostility toward the day
laborers themselves.' Furthermore, section (b) would still be
unnecessary because of the availability of a narrowly tailored state
law against stopping a vehicle "so as to obstruct the normal
movement of traffic.""m Depending on the other evidence available,
the city ordinance's redundancy could weigh against the city in an
equal protection challenge. Finally, the resulting ordinance would
still be broad, sweeping in "a motorist who stops, on a residential
street, to inquire whether a neighbor's teenage daughter or son would
be interested in performing yard work or babysitting."l41 While
enforcement against such a driver seems unlikely-as the dissent
points out-that unlikelihood itself suggests that the city had a
specific use in mind for the law, intending to use it only against
employers of day laborers.142 For these reasons, severing section (a)
from the Redondo Beach ordinance would fail to solve the
overbreadth problem and would further invite accusations of racial
animus in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Another possible approach is to narrow section (a) to prohibit
only solicitation of work-not solicitation of business or
contributions-while providing alternative channels of
communication for work solicitation. This approach would avoid
sweeping in most of the examples of protected speech covered by an
137. REDONDO BEACH, CAL, MUN. CODE § 3-7.1601 (1989).
138. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 951 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,
549 (2001); United States v. City of Arcata, 629 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir.2010)) ("Because
the City has waived any argument regarding severability by failing to raise it in its briefs or
at oral argument, we do not consider it here.").
139. Doe, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 544-49 (holding that, as to the ticketing campaign,
"plaintiffs have met their burden of going forward on the issue of intentional racism").
140. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651(b) (West 2012).
141. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 948 (citing Comite 1, 475 F.Supp.2d at 965).
142. Id. at 959, 962. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (calling the majority's scenario
"unlikely and contrived" and pointing out the absence of any "'Girl Scout Cookie
Enforcement Project,' 'Lemonade Stand Enforcement Project,' 'Push-Cart Vendor
Enforcement Project' or any other of the horrible abuses the majority fears the ordinance
will be subject to").
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overbroad ordinance: Girl Scouts selling cookies, children selling
lemonade, children advertising a carwash fundraiser, leaving only the
babysitter example to worry about. 143  It would also address Judge
Smith's concern, expressed in his concurrence, that the ordinance fails
not just for lack of narrow tailoring but also for the absence of
alternative channels for the day laborers to communicate their
availability for work.'4" Such alternatives might include the
designation of less congested streets or the establishment of a hiring
center.4  But even with alternative channels, the resulting ordinance
could provide evidence of animus toward day laborers if the city
allows other groups' solicitation conduct to go unabated. Narrowing
the ordinance to employment solicitation is especially suspicious
considering that traffic issues can and do arise when, for example,
students stand on a busy street directing drivers to a fundraising
carwash around the corner.14
The majority flatly dismissed other efforts to narrow the
Redondo Beach ordinance. For example, the city argued that the
ordinance should be construed to apply only to solicitors who actually
cause drivers to stop because they are the only solicitors against
whom the ordinance has been enforced so far."' But the ordinance's
plain language refers to all solicitors, regardless of their actual effect
on motorists, and the court is "not required to insert missing terms
into the statute."'48 The more selectively the city enforces the law, the
likelier its conduct may draw a credible equal protection challenge.
Fortunately, there are proven ways for cities to address community
143. Id. at 948. Judge Kozinski dismisses these examples as the majority's "parade of
horribles." Id. at 959.
144. Id. at 955-57 (Smith, J., concurring).
145. The latter is a successful approach employed by many cities. See infra Part IV.
An adequate alternative channel for communication would have been enough to satisfy
Judge Gould that the ordinance itself was constitutional. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 951
(Gould, J., concurring). Judge Kozinski points out the availability of "six day-laborer
centers in Southern California," saying "there is a crucial difference between having no
alternatives and having slightly inconvenient alternatives." Id. at 967 (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting). He is perhaps underestimating the difficulty of getting around in Los Angeles,
especially for day laborers who don't have vehicles.
146. The author recently observed traffic and pedestrians struggling to move around a
Girl Scout Cookie sales booth set up next to the curb on a busy corner of her city's central
business district.
147. Comite III, 657 F.3d at 946.
148. Id. (citing Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir.1998)). See also
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 (1988) ("This presumes
the mayor will act in good faith and adhere to standards absent from the ordinance's
face.").
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concerns about day labor solicitation without infringing on the
constitutional rights of day laborers.
IV. Models for Cooperation
Instead of enacting prohibitions, cities can take positive actions
to improve circumstances for all community members. As
communities across the country have grappled over the last two
decades with the need for residents to make themselves available for
day labor, numerous ideas and reforms have surfaced. Often, local
conflict and legal challenges motivate communities to revisit their
assumptions and make lasting change in the relationship between day
laborers and city government.
Day labor employment centers have developed a record of
success in giving workers and employers a way to connect while
avoiding traffic problems and harassment of day laborers." Such
centers offer many advantages. Giving workers a place gather other
than on sidewalks can reduce traffic complaints. Centers can increase
the employer pool to include individual homeowners, who might be
less reluctant to come to a center than to pull up alongside a curb. A
day labor center can also feel safer for employers as well as workers,
since both parties are typically required to give the center some
information about themselves before using the services. Such
registration can discourage dishonest employers from taking
advantage of day laborers.'
There are less obvious advantages as well. A day labor center
can maintain a database of skills and equipment, matching a worker
to the needs of the employer. Unlike the street corner, a center can
implement a rotation to spread the jobs equally among workers. Such
systems can promote camaraderie among laborers and allow
newcomers to benefit from the support of more experienced day
laborers. A day labor center can provide classes in English and
computer skills, and bring in professionals to provide medical care or
legal advice. A center can also maintain detailed records and
statistics, as in Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, where the Hispanic
149. For a broad discussion of the benefits and uses of day labor centers, see
INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIES FOR DAY LABOR
CENTERS (2011), available at http://www.ca-ilg.org/collaborativestrategiesfor
daylaborcenters; see also ALINDOR, supra note 12 (detailing the services provided at day
labor centers throughout the San Francisco Bay Area).
150. See generally CENTER FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW, supra note 12.
141Fall 2012]1 A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA FOR CITIES
Resource Center's daily records composed much of the basis for the
court's factual findings.51
In the California city of Mountain View, the Day Worker Center
(Centro Obrero de los Trabajadores) has had a number of unexpected
benefits resulting from close collaboration with community leaders in
Mountain View and other nearby cities.' For example, the center
hosts a sizable community of women, who find it a safe place to find
domestic jobs. The center also provides an organized means for day
laborers to serve the local community, through blood drives,
community clean-up days, and special projects. Volunteers from the
surrounding communities go on-site to teach classes, and the center
has become a forum for educating civic leaders and students on the
lives of immigrant day laborers.
The availability of a center does not change everything, however.
The most common way for day laborers and employers to connect
remains gathering along streets, and the case law strongly supports
the right of day laborers to do so.'" A San Francisco area study from
2007 identified one approach a center can take as working directly
with day laborers on the streets, rather than attempting to steer them
and their employers to central offices." This model also gives
organizers a chance to prevent community conflict by educating
laborers on behavioral norms affecting local perceptions of them."'s
Thus, positive education can circumvent the need for enforcement. A
first-of-its kind Los Angeles ordinance passed in 2009 is a codification
151. Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 at 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(finding that "[flor the 15 months of the site's operation, the Hispanic Resource Center
employed a site coordinator, Janet Rolon, who was present at the site on a daily basis, and
kept notes of each day's activities," and that her records were "the only contemporaneous
records reflecting the daily activity of the day laborers since November 2004").
152. See THE DAY WORKER CENTER OF MOUNTAIN VIEW,
http://www.dayworkercentermv.org/ (last visited March 30, 2012).
153. See Comite III, 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011); Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rights
of Los Angeles v. Burke (CHIRLA), No. CV 98-4863-GHK(CTX), 2000 WL 1481467
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2000) (invalidating an ordinance against soliciting "employment,
business, or contributions"). See also Campbell, supra note 10 (discussing Jornaleros
Unidos de Baldwin Park v. City of Baldwin Park, No. 07-CV-4135-ER (C.D. Cal. July 17,
2007) (granting preliminary injunction against ordinance prohibiting any solicitation on a
sidewalk without a three-foot pedestrian buffer zone)).
154. ALINDOR, supra note 12 at Regional Summary 5.
155. Id. at Regional Summary 9 (noting that many centers work with newer day
laborers to "openly address behavioral issues that negatively affect how day laborers are
perceived by residents and merchants. These include public urination, drunkenness,
fighting, and drug dealing. Most programs have formal rules and/or codes of conduct
concerning these matters.").
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of these principles: it allows the city to require new "big box" stores
to provide on-site centers for day laborers as a means of providing
opportunity, requiring the industry that benefits from day labor to
share in the costs, and preventing the negative perceptions that put
day laborers in the crosshairs of anti-immigrant groups.'
Conclusion
Day laborers' rights reside at the junction of many
quintessentially American values: opportunity, hard work, economic
development, community cohesion, and constitutional protection.
Unfortunately, in many cities and towns, the presence of day laborers
is also a flashpoint for rancorous debate over community
preservation, civil rights, and immigration policy. City leaders can
protect their communities from constitutional challenges and improve
the tenor of the debate through good-faith efforts to solve real
problems while safeguarding the constitutional rights of all residents.
156. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE, ch. 1, art. 2, § 12.24(U)(14) (permitting the
City Planning Commission to require any new home improvement store to supply "written
Day Laborer operating standards," including a "suitable area located on site for Day
Laborers seeking employment with customers at the Home Improvement Store," and
establishing certain requirements for such a center). See also Catherine L. Fisk, The Anti-
Subordination Principle of Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 17 (2011).
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